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SHOULD PARENTS BE NOTIFIED OF THEIR MINOR
DAUGHTER'S ABORTION? A PREGNANT QUESTION FOR
FLORIDA LEGISLATORS
CHARLOTTE E. PARSONS
S INCE the United States Supreme Court's decision in Roe v.
Wade,' state legislatures have struggled with the issue of per-
missible regulation of abortion.2 The Florida Legislature is no ex-
ception; twice it has enacted statutes regulating abortions for mi-
nors, and both times the statutes were held unconstitutional.3
The purpose of this Comment is to analyze the latest proposal to
regulate minors' abortions, Committee Substitute for House Bill
80,' in light of developing case law. The bill passed the House of
Representatives during the 1986 Regular Session but died in the
Senate Committee on Health and Rehabilitative Services.5
The final version of the 1986 abortion bill proposed that the
physician or his agent6 obtain the written informed consent of a
pregnant minor before performing an abortion. In addition, the bill
proposed that actual notice of the abortion be given to both par-
ents or to the minor's legal guardian. 7 These requirements would
not have applied in medical emergencies or, so long as the mother
was notified, in cases where the father or legal guardian had im-
pregnated the minor. In giving notice, the physician could have re-
lied, if in good faith, on the statement of the one giving consent
that he or she was the parent of the minor. In addition, the physi-
cian could have relied on the patient's representation that she was
married or of age. The physician also would have been required to
inform the minor that she could petition the circuit court to waive
the notice requirement. The court would have ensured that her
identity and all proceedings would be confidential, that she would
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Comment, Abortion: From Roe to Akron, Changing Standards of Analysis, 33 CATH.
U.L. REv. 393 (1984).
3. Scheinberg v. Smith, 659 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1981); Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787 (5th
Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. sub nom. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
4. Fla. CS for HB 80 (1986) (Second Engrossed). The Senate companion, Fla. SB 125
(1986), was almost identical to the House bill. Because the Senate bill never had a hearing,
only the House bill is discussed in this Comment.
5. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1986 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS
at 211, CS for HB 80.
6. For ease of discussion, future references to physicians or doctors in regard to giving
notice or obtaining consent include the physicians' agents.
7. Future references to parents also refer to guardians or anyone else to whom notice or
consent may be given to satisfy a notice or consent statute.
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be given assistance in filing her petition, and that counsel would be
provided at her request. A confidential appeal would have been
available, and no minor would have been charged fees for using the
bypass procedures. All proceedings would have been given such
precedence as necessary to ensure a prompt decision.
The court could have waived the notice requirement if it found
the minor sufficiently mature and well-informed to make the abor-
tion decision or that termination of the pregnancy would be in the
minor's best interest. If the court failed to render an opinion
within two weeks of the filing of the petition or appeal, actual no-
tice requirements would have been automatically waived.
I. CURRENT STATE OF FLORIDA LAW
Florida's statute regulating abortions for minors8 was under at-
tack in Coe v. Gerstein' when the Supreme Court concluded in Roe
v. Wade'0 that the constitutional right to privacy included the
right to choose abortion. Two years later, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that Roe had re-
served judgment on the constitutionality of parental consent re-
quirements." Nevertheless, the court balanced the state's interest
in requiring parental consent 12 against the minor's right to choose
whether to have an abortion and, finding the state's interest insuf-
ficient to merit a veto over the minor's decision, struck down the
statute. 3
8. FLA. STAT. § 458.22(3) (1973) provided: "If the pregnant woman is under eighteen
years of age and unmarried, in addition to her request, the written consent of a parent,
custodian, or legal guardian must be obtained."
9. 376 F. Supp. 695, 696 (S.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd sub nom. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787
(5th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. sub nom. Gerstein v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
10. 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
11. Poe v. Gerstein, 517 F.2d 787, 789 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975), aff'd mem. sub nom. Gerstein
v. Coe, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
12. Poe, 517 F.2d at 791-94 (state's interests in deterring illicit teenage sexual conduct,
improving quality of minor's abortion decision, fostering parental control over children, and
supporting family not compelling interests and not achieved by requiring parental consent).
13. Coe, 376 F. Supp. at 699. The three-judge panel held the parental consent statute
invalid, stating:
We do not learn from the opinion in Roe v. Wade, the age of ... the pregnant
woman who enjoyed the "fundamental", "personal right of privacy" . . . recog-
nized by the Supreme Court. But we do know that a pregnant woman under 18
years of age cannot, under the law, be distinguished from one over 18 years of age
in. reference to "fundamental", "personal", constitutional rights.
[A] state which has no power to regulate abortions in certain areas simply
cannot constitutionally grant power to . . . parents to regulate in those areas.
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In 1979, Florida again tried to regulate minors' abortions by
amending the Medical Practice Act. 14 The Act required a minor to
have informed written consent of a parent or a court order before
she could obtain a legal abortion. The court order could be based
on a showing that the minor was sufficiently mature to give her
own informed consent, the fact that a parent unreasonably had
withheld consent, the minor's fear of physical or emotional abuse if
her parent was requested to consent, or upon any other good cause.
Ultimately, however, the statute provided that "[t]he court shall
determine the best interest of the minor and enter its order in ac-
cordance with such determination."15
Legislators may have thought they had eliminated any constitu-
tional infirmities by providing a judicial bypass procedure as an
alternative to the third-party veto which parental consent require-
ments made possible. Soon after passage, however, the consent
provisions were challenged as an abridgement of the right to pri-
vacy. In Scheinberg v. Smith,"6 Dr. Mark Scheinberg sought de-
claratory and injunctive relief on behalf of all unmarried pregnant
minors who desired abortions and on behalf of their physicians.
The decision in Scheinberg was based on developing case law,
with two Supreme Court decisions providing guidance on the stan-
dards to be used in judging parental consent provisions. 7 In
Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,18 the Court struck down a Mis-
souri parental consent statute which, in effect, created an absolute
power of veto over the minor's decision. The Court found the
Id. at 698-99 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original).
14. Ch. 79-302, 1979 Fla. Laws 1596.
15. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (1985).
16. 659 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 1981). For the lower court cases, see Jones v. Smith, 474
F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (preliminary injunction against parental consent requirement
in Medical Practice Act); Scheinberg v. Smith, 482 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (provision
requiring minor to secure written informed consent of parent or order of circuit court as
precondition for abortion impermissibly invades right to privacy).
17. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52
(1976). The standard used by the Court in abortion cases dealing with minors is unclear, but
the Court is less likely to require that the regulations achieve the state interest asserted
when the regulation affects minors rather than adults. Compare H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S.
398, 442-48 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (state interest is protection of minor's health
but statute does not require parents to give health information to physician), with Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986) (states
not free to intimidate women into continuing pregnancy under guise of protecting maternal
health or potential life). See generally Comment, supra note 2; Note, Rational Basis? Strict
Scrutiny? Intermediate Scrutiny? Judicial Review in the Abortion Cases, 9 OKLA. CITY U.L.
REv. 317 (1984).
18. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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state's asserted interest was not sufficiently compelling to permit a
possibly arbitrary, third-party veto. Yet the Court intimated that
states' interests in the welfare of minors were sufficiently impor-
tant to merit some restrictions on the ability of minors to consent
to abortions.19
The Supreme Court suggested a framework for permissible abor-
tion regulation when it was asked to rule on a Massachusetts stat-
ute in Bellotti v. Baird.20 The statute required minors to obtain a
parent's consent before an abortion but provided a judicial mecha-
nism through which minors could obtain court approval without
parental consent. The statute, however, also required that the
court base its decision on the best interest of the minor. This gave
the court an absolute veto power over the wishes of even a mature
minor who had given informed consent, if the judge thought that
abortion was not in the minor's best interest.2 1 The statute was
struck down as unduly burdensome. In so doing, the Court ana-
lyzed the alternative procedure and instructed the state to permit
the minor to show that she is sufficiently mature to make the deci-
sion or that the abortion is in her best interest. Furthermore, the
alternative procedure must guarantee anonymity for the minor and
be expedited to allow time for the abortion after appeals.22
The Court also addressed a provision of the Massachusetts stat-
ute which required parents to be notified of judicial proceedings in
all cases where a minor had elected to seek judicial approval for an
abortion. The Court found this provision burdensome because
some parents might try to dissuade their daughters from using the
alternative procedure. It concluded that minors must be able to
pursue the alternative procedure without notifying their parents.2 3
The Scheinberg court relied primarily on the Bellotti criteria in
analyzing Florida's abortion statute. Once again, the statute fell
short of constitutional muster. The sticking point was the word
19. Id. at 74-75. The Court reasoned:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when
one attains the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are pro-
tected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights.
We emphasize that our holding that [the parental consent section] is invalid
does not suggest that every minor, regardless of age or maturity, may give effective
consent for termination of her pregnancy.
Id.
20. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
21. Id. at 630.
22. Id. at 643-44.
23. Id. at 647.
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"shall." The statute provided that the court "may" base its deci-
sion on the pregnant minor's maturity, her fear of abuse if a parent
is requested to consent, or any other good cause; but, the court
"shall" determine the minor's best interest and enter its decision
in accord with that determination.24 The Fifth Circuit found that
the statute required a court to disregard a mature minor's wishes if
it found the abortion was not in her best interest. This amounted
to an impermissible third-party veto similar to the one in Bellotti.
Consequently, the Fifth Circuit held the statute unconstitutional. 25
The state argued that the court should sever the objectionable
phrase and leave the statute relatively intact, asserting that the
Florida Legislature would have passed the statute without the
phrase had the Supreme Court's decision in Bellotti been availa-
ble. But the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the test was not whether
the legislature would now adhere to the constitutional mandate in
Bellotti, but whether the statute would have been enacted without
the phrase at the time the measure passed. "The last sentence of
subsection 4(a) is mandatory. As such, it is not only an integral
part of section 390.001(4)(a), but, in fact, it serves as the legislative
directive that clarifies and implements the overriding purpose of
the entire subsection. ' '2' Thus, the court refused to sever the
phrase and struck down the entire section dealing with parental
consent.21
Since Scheinberg, the Florida Legislature has been unable to
pass legislation regulating minors' abortions. After a federal dis-
trict court ordered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
the parental consent provisions,28 legislation was introduced in
1980 to repeal the challenged law.29 The bill had no Senate com-
panion and died in the House Committee on Health and Rehabili-
tative Services." Every year since, at least one bill regulating abor-
tions for minors has been introduced in the House or Senate-all
have failed.31 Thus, Florida has been operating without a valid
24. FLA. STAT. § 390.001(4)(a) (1985).
25. Scheinberg, 659 F.2d at 480-81.
26. Id. at 481.
27. Id. at 482.
28. Jones v. Smith, 474 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
29. Fla. HB 1295 (1980).
30. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1980 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 297, HB 1295.
31. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1981 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF SENATE
BILLS at 317, SB 1080; FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1982 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY
OF HOUSE BILLS at 183, HB 613; id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 285, SB 984; FLA. LEGIS.,
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statute since the district court injunction in 1979. Minors may law-
fully give written consent and obtain abortions without giving no-
tice to or obtaining consent from their parents, custodians, guardi-
ans, or the courts.2 Current Florida law does not distinguish
between minors and adults regarding abortions.
II. THE LAW IN OTHER STATES
Not all states have been so paralyzed. At least six states have
parental notice or consent statutes with some form of the bypass
provisions set forth by the Supreme Court.3 3 The statutes range
from those that are very detailed to those with just enough bypass
framework to survive constitutional scrutiny. A look at two of
these statutes, one detailed and the other not, may be useful in
evaluating Florida's abortion bills.
A. Louisiana
Louisiana has a detailed parental consent statute.3 It requires a
minor wanting an abortion to have either a notarized statement of
consent from a parent or a court order. The court order bypass
procedure requires that the girl be given instructions for filing, and
assistance if requested. Each application must be heard confiden-
tially within forty-eight hours of filing. Appeals are by trial de
novo in the court of appeal, and the same assistance and procedure
apply.3 5
At both the hearing and appellate stages, the court must author-
ize the minor to act without parental consultation or consent if she
is found sufficiently mature and well-informed. Even if the minor
is not sufficiently mature to make the decision, the court must still
HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1983 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 90, HB 276; id.,
HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 285, SB 891; FLA. LEMNS.. HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1984 REGU-
LAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 233, HB 714; id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 315,
SB 939; FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1985 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 52, HB 364; id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 72, SB 524.
32. 1979 FLA. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 12 (minor not required to have parental consent for
abortion).
33. The six states are: Arizona: ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2152(1986); Louisiana: LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (West 1977); Massachusetts: MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
112, § 12S (West 1983); Missouri: Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 (Vernon 1983); North Da-
kota: N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1 (1981); Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.7-6
(1985). See also Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Health & Rehab. Servs., HB 80 (1986) Staff
Analysis 3 (rev. Mar. 6, 1986) (on file with committee) [hereinafter cited as Staff Analysis].
34. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (West 1977).
35. Id.
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permit an abortion if it is in the minor's best interest. In all cases,
every minor who applies is entitled to a hearing and an appeal
without notice to her parents. If she has insufficient funds, she is
allowed to proceed in forma pauperis. 36
The Louisiana parental consent statute was validated by a fed-
eral district court in Margaret S. v. Treen.3 7 In opposing summary
judgment, Margaret S. contended the statute was unconstitutional
for three reasons. First, parental consent does not promote mater-
nal health or protect minors in every case. Second, the statute on
its face fails to give adequate guidance for determining the minor's
maturity or best interest. And third, as a practical matter, the
court procedure is unduly burdensome for minors seeking
abortions. 8
In considering summary judgment, the judge assumed the truth
of the allegations but found them insufficient to defeat the stat-
ute's constitutionality. He decided that the statute does not allow
the absolute third-party veto prohibited by the Court in Danforth
and does contain the elements essential to a bypass mechanism as
outlined by the Supreme Court in Bellotti3
The basis of the court's holding was unclear, however, because
the judge stated that the decision was based on the assumed truth
of the allegations, yet he also explained why he disagreed with
those allegations.4 If the judge did assume the validity of the
plaintiff's contentions-which is doubtful considering his disagree-
ment-there could be subtle yet serious implications for "unconsti-
tutional as applied" challenges of parental consent and notification
statutes. The decision suggested that as long as state legislators
follow the form outlined by the Supreme Court in Bellotti, the
practical effects of the procedure are irrelevant. This tension be-
tween form and reality is a recurring theme in abortion debate and
decisions.
B. Missouri
Missouri legislators were not as specific as their Louisiana coun-
terparts. A few gaps in the details of a bypass procedure, however,
36. Id.
37. 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984).
38. Id. at 651.
39. Id. at 652.
40. Id. at 652-53.
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will not render a statute unconstitutional." In Planned
Parenthood Association v. Ashcroft,42 the Supreme Court refused
to consider ambiguities or missing procedural details as fatal flaws.
The approved Missouri bypass mechanism provides:
(4) In the decree, the court shall for good cause: (a) Grant the
petition for majority rights for the purpose of consenting to the
abortion; or (b) Find the abortion to be in the best interests of
the minor and give judicial consent to the abortion, setting forth
the grounds for so finding; or (c) Deny the petition, setting forth
the grounds on which the petition is denied."3
This statute permits the court to choose among the alternatives.
Nothing on the statute's face requires the court to permit the abor-
tion, even if it finds the minor sufficiently mature to make her own
decision. Therefore, a court could, "for good cause," deny the abor-
tion against a mature minor's wish. This construction would make
the statute unconstitutional under Bellotti because it gives the
court an absolute veto power.
However, the Supreme Court determined that, where possible,
ambiguities must be resolved to render the statute constitutional.
Thus, the Court construed the statute to allow only what had been
permitted in earlier decisions. That is, "good cause" meant that to
deny the petition, the court must first find that the minor is not
sufficiently mature to make her own decision, and then that the
abortion would not be in her best interest."
The Missouri Legislature directed the state supreme court to
provide the necessary rules to ensure expedited judicial review.45
The Supreme Court again found no constitutional flaws. "We be-
lieve this section provides the framework for a constitutionally suf-
41. See Margaret S., 597 F. Supp. at 652 (lack of criteria to determine whether minor
may have abortion not sufficient to defeat statute, and establishment of specific criteria may
unnecessarily restrict decision-maker).
42. 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
43. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028 2(4) (Vernon 1983).
44. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 492-93.
45. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2(6) (Vernon 1983). For the expedition of appeals, this sec-
tion provides:
The notice of intent to appeal shall be given within twenty-four hours from the
date of issuance of the order. The record on appeal shall be completed and the
appeal shall be perfected within five days from the filing of notice to appeal. Be-
cause time may be of the essence regarding the performance of the abortion, the
supreme court of this state shall, by court rule, provide for expedited appellate
review of cases appealed under this section.
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ficient means of expediting judicial proceedings. . . There is no
reason to believe that Missouri will not expedite any appeal consis-
tent with the mandate in our prior opinions."' 46 Unfortunately,
nothing in the Missouri court's rules ensured expedited considera-
tion, either. The Missouri Supreme Court amended Missouri Rule
of Civil Procedure 84.02 to provide merely that "[a]ppellate review
of cases appealed under [the parental consent bypass provision]
.. .shall be expedited. 47
The dearth of detail in this rule-which was supposed to fill the
statute's gaps-resulted in the statute being challenged on its face
and as applied in T.L.J. v. Webster.48 T.L.J. argued that the rule is
constitutionally deficient because it directs that appeals be expe-
dited but provides no detailed instructions. The plaintiffs relied on
a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit4 9 regarding a similar Pennsylvania statute.50 In examining
the Missouri procedure, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit stated: "To pass constitutional muster, the alterna-
tive judicial procedure must be an established and practical avenue
and may not rely solely on generally stated principles of availabil-
ity, confidentiality, and form."''5 In finding Missouri's statute
facially valid, the Eighth Circuit distinguished it from the Pennsyl-
vania statute:
[Tihe Third Circuit [in American College of Obstetricians & Gy-
necologists v. Thornburgh] expressly contrasted the Pennsylvania
statute to the Missouri statute ... and noted that the Missouri
statute stood on its own. The statute itself sets out the procedure
46. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 491 n.16.
47. Mo. R. Civ. P. 84.02.
48. 792 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1986).
49. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283 (3d
Cir. 1984), a/f'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986). The
section on parental consent had been enjoined by the Third Circuit until the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania promulgated rules ensuring confidentiality and promptness. Therefore, that
section was not before the Supreme Court on appeal. Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2177 n.9 (1986).
50. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3206 (1983). Essentially, the statute provides that if the preg-
nant minor elects not to seek her parent'sconsent, the court of common pleas in the district
where she resides or where the abortion is to be performed shall, after an appropriate hear-
ing, authorize the abortion if the court finds the minor mature or that the abortion is in her
best interest. The minor may participate in the proceedings and have appointed counsel
upon request. Court proceedings shall be confidential and be given precedence over pending
matters so the court may reach a decision promptly to serve the best interest of the preg-
nant minor.
51. T.L.J., 792 F.2d at 737 (quoting American College, 737 F.2d at 297).
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for judicial bypass of parental consent, instructs the juvenile
court on the evidence to be taken, directs court clerks to assist
petitioners with filing their petitions, and sets up a timetable for
commencing appeals. The Pennsylvania statute was not similarly
detailed. 52
In T.L.J., the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismis-
sal of the "as applied" challenge on the grounds that it was moot,
because T.L.J. had obtained a legal abortion after the district
court had temporarily enjoined the state from enforcing the stat-
ute. In addition, she had turned eighteen before the final decision,
putting her beyond the terms of the statute. 3 Thus, the constitu-
tionality of the Missouri statute as applied is still undetermined.
III. THE FLORIDA LEGISLATION
In recent years, the Florida Legislature has considered several
parental involvement statutes, often varying dramatically from one
year to the next, depending upon whether the sponsors were con-
cerned with notice or consent or both. At least one of the propos-
als, had it passed, presumably could not have withstood constitu-
tional analysis.
A. A Parade of Bills
With the steady stream of Florida bills attempting to regulate
minors' abortions during the past five years,54 one might expect to
find an evolution culminating in the 1986 version. This has not
been the case. Compare, for example, the various proposals on the
degree of parental involvement required. In 1982, the House bill
would have mandated the written informed consent of both par-
ents in most cases and a judicial bypass alternative.55 The 1983
House bill would have required notice to only one parent and a
waiting period of twenty-four hours in the case of actual written
notice and forty-eight hours for constructive notice before a physi-
52. T.L.J., 792 F.2d at 737-38.
53. Id. at 738-39.
54. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
55. Fla. HB 613 (1982). The bill died in the House Health and Rehabilitative Services
Committee. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1982 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 183, HB 613. A similar Senate bill died in the Senate Rules and Calendar Commit-
tee. Id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 308, SB 984.
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cian could perform an abortion on a minor. 6 Again, the bill pro-
vided a judicial waiver mechanism.57 In 1984, proponents returned
to an informed written consent provision, this time proposing that
consent be required from only one parent.58 In addition, judicial
proceedings would have required service of the minor's petition on
a parent. Thus, parental consent would have been required in most
cases and notice in all cases.59 The House bill introduced in 1985
was a notice proposal which would have required a physician to
give actual notice to both parents by telephone or in person. The
bill also provided a judicial bypass without notice to the parents.6 0
This bill, sponsored by Representative Watt,61 was identical to the
one he introduced in the 1986 Regular Session. 2
B. Amendment Analysis
Although past bills are of limited help, the amendments offered
to the 1986 bill-whether they were adopted or failed-offer some
insight into the theoretical and practical problems lawmakers en-
counter in attempting to legislate on this subject.
1. Notice
As filed, House Bill 80 would have amended section 390.001,
Florida Statutes, to require a physician or his agent to give actual
notice in person or by telephone to both parents when planning to
terminate the pregnancy of an unmarried minor. If the parents
56. Fla. HB 276 (1983). The bill was indefinitely postponed and withdrawn while in the
House Health and Rehabilitative Services Committee. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION,
1983 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 90, HB 276. An identical Senate bill, Fla.
SB 891 (1983), met the same fate in the Senate Health and Rehabilitative Services Commit-
tee. Id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 285, SB 891.
57. Fla. HB 276 (1983).
58. Fla. HB 714 (1984). The bill died in the House Health and Rehabilitative Services
Committee. FLA. LEGIS.. HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1984 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE
BILLS at 233-34, HB 714. An identical Senate bill died in the Senate Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services Committee. Id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS at 316-17, SB 939.
59. Fla. HB 714 (1984). This bill's notice requirement would have run into constitutional
trouble when judged by the standard in Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 647 (1979) (every
minor must have opportunity to go to court without *first notifying her parents).
60. Fla. HB 364 (1985). The bill was reported favorably by the House Health and Reha-
bilitative Services Committee but died on the calendar. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION,
1985 REGULAR SESSION, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS at 52, HB 364. An identical Senate bill died
in the Senate Health and Rehabilitative Services Committee. Id., HISTORY OF SENATE BILLS
at 72, SB 524.
61. Repub., Lake Park, 1978-1986.
62. Fla. HB 80 (1986).
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were divorced or one was unavailable, notice to the parent who was
available or had custody of the minor would have been sufficient.
The bill did not provide for constructive notice when a physician
tried but was unable to give actual notice. 3 Notice would not have
been required where a medical emergency dictated an immediate
abortion based on the doctor's best medical judgment. The bill
would have applied to residents and nonresidents alike.6 4
a. Legislative Exceptions to Parental Notice
Almost immediately, legislators recognized limited circumstances
where notice to only one parent would be sufficient. One amend-
ment,6 offered by Representative Thomas66 during a meeting of
the House Subcommittee on Health and Economic Services, would
have permitted notice to only one parent in cases of legal separa-
tion. 7 Representative Thomas explained that this provision would
cover situations where notice to both parents could cause more
family strife than help. Without the amendment, only the judicial
bypass procedure would have been available to avoid notice to a
legally separated spouse living in the same town or otherwise
available. 68
The incest amendment, which was adopted during the House
floor debate, provided that notice to the mother alone would be
sufficient when the father had impregnated the minor.69 Propo-
nents suggested that in other cases of incest, notice would have to
be given to both the mother and father unless the minor obtained
a judicial waiver.70
63. The bill's silence regarding constructive notice, coupled with application to out-of-
state residents, seems to indicate that a parent's absence from the state would not trigger a
nonjudicial exemption from notifying both parents.
64. Fla. HB 80, sec. 1, at 2, line 27 (1986).
65. For ease of discussion, several amendments have been labeled by the author al-
though they were not referred to as such by legislators.
66. Repub., Englewood.
67. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health & Rehab. Servs., Subcomm. on Health & Econ. Servs.,
tape recording of proceedings (Mar. 4, 1986) (on file with committee).
68. Id.
69. Fla. H.R., tape recording of proceedings (May 6, 7, 1986) (on file with Clerk) (discus-
sion of amendments 6, 9 to HB 80) [hereinafter cited as House Tape I and House Tape II
respectively]. The first proposed incest amendment was not adopted because it would have
permitted a notice exception for any kind of incestuous relationship which caused the preg-
nancy. House Tape I, supra. For the text, see FLA. H.R. JOUR. 264-65 (Reg. Sess. May 6,
1986) (amendment 6 to HB 80). For the text of the final version of the incest amendment,
see FLA. H.R. JOUR. 277 (Reg. Seas. May 7, 1986) (amendment 9 to HB 80).
70. House Tape I, supra note 69; House Tape I, supra note 69.
ABORTION NOTIFICATION
Discussion on the House floor suggested that if the minor's par-
ents were alive and not within the above exceptions (that is, not
divorced, legally separated, or involved in an incestuous relation-
ship with the minor), actual notice to both parents would have to
be given, not simply attempted. 7' The legislators' rejection of an
amendment that would have waived the notice and bypass require-
ments for minors who attested by a sworn affidavit that they were
victims of child abuse, including aggravated child abuse supports
this implication.7 2 Lawmakers also rejected an amendment which
would have permitted abandoned minors or those without parents
to receive a legal abortion without the bypass procedure.73
Additionally, members rejected an amendment by Representa-
tive Gustafson7 4 which would have strongly encouraged, but not
mandated, parental notice.7 5 The minor could have consented to
the abortion as though she were an adult. The doctor would have
had to make a good faith attempt to notify or persuade the minor
to notify her parents and would have had to inform the minor of
her duty to tell her parents. If the parents learned of the abortion,
they would have been allowed access to their daughter's medical
records and have been permitted to talk with her.7' Taken to-
gether, the action on these amendments suggest that in all but the
most limited situations, actual notice or a judicial waiver would
have been necessary before an unmarried minor could obtain a le-
gal abortion.
b. Minors' Rights Amendments
Two amendments were designed to inform minors of their rights
under House Bill 80. One amendment, proposed in the House Ap-
propriations Committee, 7 prohibited any person from notifying
the parents without first informing the minor of her right to a judi-
71. House Tape I, supra note 69; House Tape II, supra note 69.
72. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 264-65 (Reg. Sess. May 6, 1986). Lawmakers believed that requiring
children to take advantage of the judicial bypass would put them in touch with agencies
that could help put an end to the abusive situations. House Tape I, supra note 69.
73. Rep. Deutsch, Dem., Sunrise, offered the amendment during House floor debate. It
would have exempted those minors living on their own from the notice requirement and, by
implication, from the bypass alternative. The amendment was tabled. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 264
(Reg. Sess. May 6, 1986) (amendment 5 to HB 80).
74. Dem., Ft. Lauderdale.
75. FLA. HR. JouR. 277 (Reg. Sess. May 7, 1986) (amendment 10 to HB 80).
76. Id.
77. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Approp., tape recording of proceedings (Apr. 29, 1986) (hearing
on HB 80) (on file with committee) [hereinafter cited as Appropriations Tape].
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cial waiver, and without providing her with the proper application
form for the procedure.7 8 This amendment passed without objec-
tion.79 Another amendment, adopted during House debate,80 would
have required a physician to ascertain whether a minor was being
coerced into an abortion and inform her of her right to complete
the pregnancy.81 These amendments attempted to ensure that the
minor's decision-either for or against abortion-would be made
with full knowledge of her rights and without undue pressure.
2. Bypass
As introduced, House Bill 80 would have allowed a minor to pe-
tition the circuit court for a waiver of the notice requirements. The
court would have assisted in filing the petition and ensured confi-
dentiality. The minor could have participated on her own behalf or
through a next friend.82 She would have been advised of her right
to court-appointed counsel, and have been provided counsel at her
request. No minor would have been assessed fees or costs. The
court could have waived the notice requirement 83 if it found that
the minor was sufficiently mature and well-informed to make the
abortion decision, or that the abortion would be in her best inter-
est. Finally, an expedited confidential appeal would have been
available. 8' These provisions survived the sometimes heated debate
to emerge unchanged in the final version of the bill.85
78. Fla. CS for HB 80, sec. 1, at 2, line 25 (1986).
79. Appropriations Tape, supra note 77.
80. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 264 (Reg. Sess. May 6, 1986) (amendment 2 to HB 80).
81. Id.
82. During House debate, Rep. Upchurch, Dem., St. Augustine, defined next friend as
someone, not necessarily a lawyer, who informally represents a person incompetent to re-
present herself in court. Generally, minors are not considered competent to participate in
court proceedings. House Tape II, supra note 69. House Bill 80 would have removed that
disability, but also would have permitted the minor to petition through a next friend if
desired. Fla. CS for HB 80, sec. 1, at 3, line 3 (1986) (Second Engrossed).
83. Rep. Watt emphasized that the judge would not decide whether the abortion would
occur, only whether the parents would have to be notified. Appropriations Tape, supra note
77.
84. Fla. HB 80, sec. 1, at 3, line 22 (1986). Rep. Watt explained that only a minor could
appeal. Since the proceedings would be confidential, no one-certainly no adverse
party-would be aware the proceedings had taken place. Appropriations Tape, supra note
77.
85. Fla. CS for HB 80 (1986) (Second Engrossed).
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a. Records Amendment
Concerns about confidentiality prompted Representative Gustaf-
son to introduce an amendment on record-keeping. 6 The concern
arose from the bill's requirement that the court issue written find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law to support its decision, and that
it maintain confidential records of evidence. Representative Gus-
tafson explained that "confidential records have a way of. . . be-
coming unconfidential. ' 8 7 The better approach, he suggested,
would to be to reaffirm that all evidence and records be confiden-
tial, and leave it to the court to decide what to keep. His amend-
ment modified the provision so that "[a]ny court that conducts
proceedings under this subparagraph shall order all records of the
proceeding and evidence introduced pursuant to the proceeding be
kept confidental [sic]." 88 The amendment was adopted without
objection."
b. Time Limit Amendment
To ensure that the waiver process would be expedited,90 Repre-
sentative Martin"' introduced an amendment that would have
compelled the court to render an opinion within two weeks of filing
the petition or appeal. Notice would not be required if the court
failed to rule within the time limit. The court clerk would
promptly indicate that failure on the petition and mail a copy to
the minor . 2 Representative Martin suggested that by forcing the
court to act promptly, the amendment made the right to bypass
parental notice more realistic.9 The time limit amendment also
was adopted without objection."
c. Bypass Choice Amendment
The House agreed with making judicial bypass the only alterna-
tive to notice. Members rejected an amendment by Representative
Deutsch that would have given minors a choice of seeking a waiver
86. Appropriations Tape, supra note 77.
87. Id.
88. Fla. CS for HB 80, sec. 1, at 3, line 30 (1986).
89. Appropriations Tape, supra note 77.
90. Id.
91. Dem., Hawthorne.
92. Fla. CS for HB 80, sec. 1, at 4, line 7 (1986).
93. Appropriations Tape, supra note 77.
94. Id.
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of notice through the court system or from two independent physi-
cians.9 5 The physicians would have used the same standards as a
court in granting a notice waiver-the minor's maturity or best
interest. 6
3. Penalties
As filed, House Bill 80 would have greatly increased physicians'
exposure to liability by making the failure to give notice prima fa-
cie evidence of failure to obtain informed consent and of interfer-
ence with family relations. In addition, the bill provided that Flor-
ida law would not be construed to preclude punitive damages for
violations of the notice provisions.97
a. Liability Amendment
The House Appropriations Committee struck the paragraph out-
lining physicians' heightened liability under the bill.98 Members
were concerned about creating a new tort which would increase
physicians' exposure, especially when only actual oral notice would
have satisfied the bill's provisions. Verbal notice would have ex-
posed doctors to the risk of having to prove they had indeed given
notice if unhappy parents alleged that the physicians had not.9
The liability amendment reinstated the status quo with regard
to civil and criminal liability for obtaining informed consent. Par-
ents not notified before an abortion and minors not told of their
right to seek judicial waiver of notice still could have sued the phy-
sician. By analogy, the physician also might have been held liable
for not determining whether the minor was coerced and for not
informing her of her right to carry to term. A doctor would still
have been subject to any criminal penalties under Florida law for
failure to obtain an informed consent. 100
95. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 264 (Reg. Sess. May 6, 1986) (amendment 1 to HB 80).
96. Id.
97. Fla. HB 80, sec. 1, at 4, line 1 (1986).
98. Appropriations Tape, supra note 77.
99. See id.; Fla. H.R., Comm. on Health & Rehab. Servs., tape recording of proceedings
(Apr. 8, 1986) (on file with committee) (testimony of attorney representing Florida Coalition
for Choice). The problem of complying and proving compliance with the bill would have
been further exacerbated by a parent's refusal to record the notice information. See infra
note 109 and accompanying text.
100. Appropriations Tape, supra note 77.
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b. Good Faith Amendment
The House Appropriations Committee also adopted an amend-
ment to permit a physician to rely in good faith on the statement
that one was the minor's parent.' °1 Discussion centered on what a
doctor would have to do to rely "in good faith." Representative
Gordon"°2 suggested that it would be reasonable if "the physician
simply has to believe that-take it on faith-[the name the patient
submits as the parent's is in fact the parent's name] and not be
required to make any other determination if it sounds like it's a
mature adult on the other end [of the telephone]."' 03
The physician could have relied in good faith on a patient's rep-
resentations that she was not a minor or that she was married.' 0 ' A
doctor without actual knowledge to the contrary could have relied
on the patient's representations "without having to do any type of
background check relative to compliance with this statute.' ' 0 5
Thus, it would seem-to the apparent chagrin of some legisla-
tors '0-that a physician would not have needed to check drivers'
licenses, marriage licenses, or other identification. 10 7
The good faith amendment introduced two potential problems.
First, it would have permitted a physician to rely in good faith on
the representations of "the person giving consent.' 0 8 This lan-
guage suggested that parents must not only be notified, but also
must consent. The rest of the bill mandated notice only. Represen-
tative Watt always explained the bill in terms of notice, not con-
sent. The consent language made the bill unnecessarily ambiguous.
101. Fla. CS for HB 80, sec. 1, at 4, line 26 (1986). The good faith amendment refers
collectively to an amendment by Rep. Martin and an amendment to the amendment by
Rep. Simon, Dem., Miami. See Appropriations Tape, supra note 77.
102. Dem., North Miami.
103. Appropriations Tape, supra note 77.
104. The notice requirements would have applied only to unmarried minors. Rep. Watt
explained that a divorced minor would not be considered married under the proposal, but
would be exempt nonetheless because she would be emancipated. Id. The notice require-
ment would not have applied because an emancipated person is not considered a minor. By
analogy, widowed minors also would have been exempt.
105. Id. (statement of Rep. Simon).
106. Rep. Watt said the good faith amendment was an attempt to dilute the impact of
the bill by relieving doctors of responsibility for giving actual notice to the parents. Id.
Another representative said the bill with the amendment would have encouraged pregnant
minors to lie about their status as unmarried minors and to have imposters take the notice
for their parents. See House Tape II, supra note 69.
107. Appropriations Tape, supra note 77.
108. Fla. CS for HB 80 sec. 1, at 4, line 19 (1986).
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Second, the good faith amendment provided that the person re-
ceiving notice record the date and other facts regarding notice. Re-
cording the information "shall meet the informed consent require-
ments of law relating to the giving of such notice." '09 This
provision raised the question of whether the physician could fulfill
his informed consent obligations if a parent receiving notice re-
fused to record the information. Neither problem was discussed by
legislators.
C. Constitutional Analysis
Only once has the Supreme Court addressed the constitutional-
ity of a statute requiring parental notice, rather than consent. H.L.
v. Matheson'" involved a Utah statute which required the physi-
cian in all cases to "[nlotify, if possible, the parents or guardian of
the woman upon whom the abortion is to be performed, if she is a
minor. '
H.L. argued that the statute was overbroad because it could be
construed to apply to all unmarried minor girls, including those
who were mature or emancipated. The Court did not address that
question because the appellant did not allege, nor was it found,
that she was mature or emancipated; therefore, she lacked stand-
ing to raise that issue. The Court rendered a narrow decision, hold-
ing that a statute requiring notice (but not giving parents or the
courts a veto) was constitutional as applied to a minor "(a) when
the girl is living with and dependent upon her parents, (b) when
she is not emancipated by marriage or otherwise, and (c) when she
has made no claim or showing as to her maturity or as to her rela-
tions with her parents." '112
The narrowness of the holding, coupled with the Court's refusal
in Bellotti to require notice in every case where a minor seeks to
bypass parental consent, suggested that the Court may require the
same kind of bypass mechanism for parental notification statutes
as for parental consent. At least two courts have applied the Su-
preme Court's consent analysis and standards to parental notice.1 1 3
109. Fla. CS for HB 80, sec. 1, at 4, line 23 (1986).
110. 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
111. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1978).
112. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 407. But see Matheson, 450 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concur-
ring) (state may not require notice to parents in all cases without providing independent
decision-maker to whom the minor has recourse).
113. Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1539 (7th Cir. 1985) ("This standard [for judging
consent bypass provisions] also governs provisions requiring parental notification."), cert.
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1. Notice
Assuming that the state's interests in maternal health and fam-
ily involvement are sufficient to allow notice requirements,"1 4 the
notice provisions of House Bill 80 probably would have been con-
stitutional. Notification of both parents is not considered unduly
burdensome '1 5 and the House bill would have made the require-
ment even less burdensome by providing that under some circum-
stances notification of only one parent would be sufficient.
Additionally, House Bill 80 did not contain a mandatory waiting
period between the time of notice and abortion. Waiting periods
for adults were struck down by the Court in City of Akron v. Ak-
ron Center for Reproductive Health,'1 6 but courts have given con-
flicting answers to the question as applied to minors. A mandatory
waiting.period for minors was struck down by the Seventh Circuit
in Zbaraz v. Hartigan.'1 7 The court reasoned that the waiting pe-
riod created a substantial burden on a woman seeking abortion
and found that the state had failed to tailor the requirement to
apply only to immature minors. '8 Conversely, in Akron Center for
Reproductive Health v. Rosen,"1 9 a federal district court found a
waiting period requirement sufficiently tailored to meet the state's
interest in promoting consultation with parents. ' °
Finally, the notice provisions of House Bill 80 would have dimin-
ished any burden by providing that either the physician or his
agent could give the notice.' This approach would have avoided
the infirmities of statutes which have been struck down because
granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1986) (No. 85-673); Akron Center for Reproductive
Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123, 1133 (N.D. Ohio 1986) ("[Tlhe practical equivalency for
dependent minor women of consent and notification statutes requires that this Court es-
chew the distinction that the state attempts to draw.").
114. See Matheson, 450 U.S. 398; Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622.
115. See Bellotti, 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
116. 462 U.S. 416, 450 (1983) (state failed to demonstrate its legitimate interest was fur-
thered by imposition of arbitrary and inflexible waiting period).
117. 763 F.2d 1532, 1539 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 14,
1986) (No. 85-673). The Court granted certiorari to consider whether a state may constitu-
tionally require minors seeking abortions to wait a specified time after their parents have
been notified before the abortion is performed.
118. Id.
119. 633 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. Ohio 1986).
120. Id. at 1139.
121. Fla. CS for HB 80, sec. 1, at 2, line 14 (1986).
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the state could not justify requiring only the physician to give
notice. 22
2. Judicial Bypass
In Bellotti, the Supreme Court set forth standards required for a
constitutionally adequate bypass procedure. The minor must be
able to show that she is mature enough to make her own decision
regarding abortion or that parental involvement is not in her best
interest. This process must be confidential and sufficiently expedi-
tious to ensure that a safe abortion would still be possible after an
appeal. 2 '
a. Time Limit
Although the Fiscal Note on Committee Substitute for House
Bill 80 stated that the bill's bypass procedure conformed with the
time frame delineated by the Supreme Court,124 the hearing and
appeal process might have taken too long to have provided a real
alternative to parental notification. The bill originally specified
that the court proceeding be given such precedence as necessary to
ensure a prompt decision and an expedited appeal.'25 The Appro-
priations Committee attempted to put teeth into those provisions
by providing that the notice requirement would be invalidated if
the court did not render an opinion within two weeks of the peti-
tion or appeal. 2 6 Therefore, under this amendment, the process
could have taken four weeks to complete, excluding time for filing.
Other states with comparable statutes require considerably
shorter maximum time periods. Louisiana requires a summary
hearing within forty-eight hours after the petition or appeal is
filed. 2 7 The Missouri statute, considered the benchmark for waiver
bypass statutes,'2 8 provides that a hearing on the merits be held
within five days of filing the petition. Furthermore, Missouri re-
122. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. at 1135; cf Akron, 462 U.S. at 447-49 (requirement that only a
physician could inform and counsel the woman found unreasonable).
123. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44.
124. See Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Approp., HB 80 (1986) Fiscal Note 2 (Apr. 29,
1986) (on file with committee).
125. Fla. HB 80, sec. 1, at 3, line 8 (1986).
126. Fla. CS for HB 80, sec. 1, at 4, line 3 (1986).
127. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5.B.(3),(8) (West 1977).
128. See Zbaraz v. Hartigan, 763 F.2d 1532, 1541 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 55
U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1986) (No. 85-673); American College of Obstetricians & Gyne-
cologists v. Thornburgh, 737 F.2d 283, 297 (3d Cir. 1984).
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quires notice of appeal within twenty-four hours after an order is
issued and the appeal must be perfected within five days after the
notice. ' House Bill 80's four-week process would have allowed
courts longer to decide than either the Missouri or Louisiana
statutes.
In Rosen, the district court compared an Ohio statute with the
Missouri statute and found Ohio's three-week time period too
long.1 30 The court stated: "Judicial notice may be taken of the fact
that teenage women are inclined towards irregular periods. Conse-
quently, a minor will require at least eight to ten weeks to discover
and confirm that she is pregnant and to consider her options."1 31
The three-week process of obtaining permission for the abortion
without parental notification could push the girl into the second
trimester of pregnancy. At this time, abortion may be so risky and
expensive that it would be an unrealistic alternative.1 32 If the Su-
preme Court were to accept the Rosen reasoning, the four-week
time frame permitted by House Bill 80 would have been
unconstitutional.
It seems unlikely that a court would engage in such blatant judi-
cial legislating as to sever the unconstitutional time requirements
and suggest that the Florida Supreme Court promulgate rules for
expedition in their place. Unlike the Missouri statute, which di-
rects the state supreme court to create the necessary rules to expe-
dite the bypass mechanism,' 33 the Florida bill contained no such
directive. Even had House members deleted the time constraints,
it is unlikely that the bill's provision for an expeditious appeal con-
tained the constitutionally necessary framework for a realistic ap-
pellate procedure.1 3'
The automatic waiver of notice provision might have withstood
constitutional scrutiny if prompt notice of the waiver could be
made without endangering confidentiality. No procedure for
prompt notification was provided, however, and mailing notice to
the minor might alert her parents. Still, the minor must be notified
129. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2.(3),(6) (Vernon 1983).
130. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. at 1141-43.
131. Id. at 1142.
132. Id.
133. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.028.2.(6) (Vernon 1983).
134. See T.L.J. v. Webster, 792 F.2d 734, 737-38 (8th Cir. 1986).
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or the automatic waiver could become an unconstitutional "pocket
veto."135
b. Confidentiality
The House bill would have encountered additional problems re-
garding the confidentiality of the bypass mechanism. The bill
would have required that the court "ensure that the minor's iden-
tity is kept confidential," and that the court "order all records of
the proceeding and evidence introduced pursuant to the proceed-
ing [to] be kept confidential."' 36 The Third Circuit in American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Thornburgh131 stated,
however, that "[t]o pass constitutional muster, the alternative judi-
cial procedure must be an established and practical avenue and
may not rely solely on generally stated principles of availability,
confidentiality, and form.' 138 Prevented by the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution from delineating specific judicial procedures, legislators in
that state directed the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to promulgate
rules to ensure confidentiality and speed in the process. The Third
Circuit has delayed judgment on Pennsylvania's bypass mechanism
until the state supreme court creates the supporting rules. 3 9 Be-
cause the Florida bill did not contain a similar state supreme court
directive, it would have had to stand or fall on its own. Measured
against the specificity of provisions in the Missouri and Massachu-
setts abortion statutes, the Florida bill would likely have been
found lacking.
Zbaraz v. Hartigan4" is one of the few cases dealing with confi-
dentiality in any detail. The court compared an Illinois statute
with the Missouri statute-which had been approved in Ash-
croft-requiring that only a minor's initials be used on the bypass
petition. The Seventh Circuit also observed that Massachusetts
does not require the minor's name on the petition. Because the
Illinois statute lacked these and other safeguards, the Zbaraz court
suggested that the statute would be invalid on its face. Neverthe-
less, it has withheld judgment until the state supreme court can
135. Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, 633 F. Supp. 1123, 1134 (N.D.
Ohio 1986).
136. Fla. CS for HB 80, sec. 1, at 3, lines 13, 31 (1986) (Second Engrossed).
137. 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
138. Id. at 297.
139. Id.
140. 763 F.2d 1532 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 55 U.S.L.W. 3247 (U.S. Oct. 14, 1986)
(No. 85-673).
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promulgate rules. House Bill 80 suffered from a similar infirmity,
but it lacked the curing directive. Consequently, these shortcom-
ings could have caused House Bill 80's bypass mechanism to fail
judicial scrutiny.
3. Constitutional "As Applied"
As more states adopt facially valid abortion statutes, doctors,
clinics, and minors are challenging those laws on the grounds that
they are unconstitutional as applied. The Supreme Court has not
addressed this argument. "As applied" challenges focus on imple-
mentation procedures-usually the bypass mechanism-to deter-
mine if there is an undue burden on the minor.14' Litigants have
asserted that a pattern of undue delay exists, that minors are not
given the necessary help to file petitions, or that judges harass the
minors and incorrectly apply the law or are unavailable because
they abstain from abortion cases. 42
The minor in T.L.J. argued that even if the Missouri statute
were constitutional on its face, "there exist[ed] a pattern of grave
deficiencies in its application, and that as a result the rights of the
appellants . .. [were] being infringed.' 1 43 The Eighth Circuit dis-
missed the argument as moot,14 4 but noted that the juvenile court
judge had not applied "the law of the land" as announced by the
Supreme Court. 45 The court suggested that the juvenile judge
should have abstained.
The Supreme Court has announced that it is a woman's right to
control the issue of her body up until the time that issue can live
separately. This decision is the law of the land. Regardless of per-
sonal discomfort with the law, it is the duty of judges to apply it.
If they cannot do so with a clear conscience, then they should
remove themselves from this class of cases. 4
141. This analysis is different from the analysis which focuses on whether the statute
achieves its stated purpose, such as the state's interest in facilitating parental involvement
and improving the quality of the minor's decision.
142. See T.L.J. v. Webster, 792 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1986); Planned Parenthood League v.
Bellotti, 608 F. Supp. 800 (D. Mass. 1985).
143. T.L.J., 792 F.2d at 738.
144. Id. at 738-39. For discussion, see text accompanying supra note 55.
145. T.L.J., 792 F.2d at 738-39 n.4.
146. Id. at 739 n.4. The Eighth Circuit included the following excerpt of the transcript
from the juvenile court proceedings as illustrative of the tone of the hearing:
MR. ZOLLENER: [Tihe petition asked you to determine whether this minor has
sufficient intellectual capacity and is intelligent enough to consent to this abortion
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But abstention-especially in rural areas where there may not be
another judge available-poses other problems. How constitutional
is a judicial bypass mechanism if there are no judges to hear the
cases?
In Massachusetts, the plaintiffs sought a declaration and order
that judges are "de facto unavailable" because of a pattern of judi-
cial harassment.14-7 Plaintiffs are also using results from a court-
ordered study with the hope of showing undue delay and burden
on minors in the administration of the parental consent law. 14 The
study recorded "the number of minors' abortion petitions
processed, length of time involved, the number of trips a minor
must make to the courthouse and other facts pertinent to the ad-
ministration" of Massachusetts' judicial bypass provisions. 149 The
federal district court abstained because a similar case was pending
in a Massachusetts state court. 5 ' The outcome could have a
profound effect on this phase of the constitutional challenges to
abortion statutes.
If successful, "as applied" challenges would imply that legisla-
tors must do more than carefully draft parental involvement stat-
utes to be facially constitutional. They also would have to provide
sufficient monetary, administrative, and judicial resources to over-
come the inherent problems suggested above.
IV. CONCLUSION
House Bill 80 failed to become law in 1986. Had it passed, it
might have been vulnerable to a constitutional challenge on its
face. The extended time frame and lack of specific judicial proce-
dures ensuring confidentiality could have proved fatal. To ensure
constitutionality, statutes of this kind should include provisions
permitting minors to use only first names or initials when they pe-
tition the court and should detail a procedure for notifying minors
without contacting them at home. Abortion legislation should also
contain the framework for a bypass procedure which will produce
under a different part of this Statute and I don't think that you have hit that
finding.
THE COURT: I will hit that finding at this time then. I don't believe that this
particular juvenile has sufficient intellectual capacity to make a determination
that she is willing to kill her own child. It's that simple.
Id.
147. Planned Parenthood League v. Bellotti, 608 F. Supp. 800, 803 (D. Mass. 1985).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 802-03.
150. Id. at 811.
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final decisions within two weeks, including appeals. Even then, if it
withstands a facial attack, an abortion statute for minors would
still be vulnerable to an "as applied" challenge. Florida legislators
should keep both the theoretical and practical considerations in
mind if they reconsider this issue.

